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Two Perspectives on Animal Morality
Are animals moral agents? In this paper, a theologian and an anthropologist unite to bring the
resources of each feld to bear on this questonn Alas, not all interdisciplinary conversatons end
harmoniously, and afer much discussion the two authors fnd themselves in substantal
disagreement over the answern The paper is therefore presented in two halves, one for each side of
the argumentn As well as presentng two diferent positons, our hope is that this paper clarifes the
diferent understandings of morality in our respectve felds and will help to ofset confusion in
interdisciplinary dialoguen
In what follows, we each present our casen In the frst secton, Adam Willows argues that moral
actvity necessarily involves the use of reason, symbolic thought and language and is on that basis an
exclusively human afairn In the second, Marcus Baynes-Rock discusses his experience of relatonality
with other creatures; a relatonality which, he argues, creates a shared understanding of obligatons
which are characteristcally moraln
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Part 1: Adam Willows
Morality and Ratonality: Only Human?
Two children, Tom and Becky, are lost and trapped in a holen They are exhausted and afraid, 
and Becky, the weaker of the two, is too tred to moven Tom provides Becky with food and water, and 
eventually they fnd a way to escapen They are savedn
Tom and Becky are mice, and their story is related in Chapter 4 of Mark Bekoffs Wild Justicn I have 
taken the liberty of naming them, however, afer Tom  awyer and Becky Thatcher from Thc 
Advcnturcs of Tom Sawycr who fnd themselves trapped for days in a caven The story above belongs 
both to the fctonal humans and to their real-life murine counterpartsn
Both Toms appear to have done a good thing in saving Beckyn I think it would be fair, as Beckyfs father
does, to “conceive a great opinion of Tom” (either Tom) and to declare that he is “no commonplace 
boy” (mouse)n But when assessing the acton of the Toms, there are two distnct courses to taken One
is to say that these incidents are one example of the shared moral realms of justce, courage, praise 
and blame that many creatures - human and non-human alike - occupy, albeit with some species-
specifc diferences in the naturc of justce, courage and so onn The other is to say that there is some 
relevant diference between the two situatons such that while we may approve of the acton of Tom 
the mouse, such approval is not moral approvaln Humans – but not other animals – operate in the 
moral spheren
I am in sympathy with the second opton, and it is my aim in this half of our paper to show why this is
the more convincing alternatven To that end, I ofer an analysis of the diferent uses of the term 
morality in our respectve disciplines, and show that the two courses above are based on very 
diferent defnitons of the term m oralityfn One defniton focuses on socially established behavioural 
norms and allows non-humans to be moral agentsn The other emphasises the normatve force of 
ratonality, and likely restricts moral agency to humansn While each defniton refers to distnct 
phenomena worthy of theoretcal and practcal study, referring to both as m oralityf has the potental
for profound confusion – a confusion which goes a long way to explaining the disagreement between
our two feldsn Rather than agree to disagree, I argue that the former defniton fails to account for 
the unique human actvity to which the later refersn
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What does ‘morality’ mean?
To a certain extent our disagreement is one over terminology, and the impetus for this paper 
was borne out of the realisaton over repeated discussions that, very ofen, biologists and 
anthropologists simply mean something quite diferent from philosophers and theologians when 
they say m oralityfn Here, for example, is Bekoffs defniton: morality is ma suite of interrelated other-
regarding behaviours that cultvate and regulate complex interactons within social groupsf (Bekof 
and Pierce 2009, 7)n Contrast this with Immanuel Kantfs claim that mall moral concepts have their seat 
and origin completely a priori in reason… just in this purity of origin lies their dignityf, or Thomas 
Aquinasf view that acts are moral minasmuch as they proceed from the reasonf (Kant 1997, 
4:411;Aquinas 1948, 1a2ae 18:5)n There may well be some overlap between these positons, 
especially in the behaviors identfed as moral; nevertheless, I think it is clear that Kant and Bekof do 
not have the same thing in mind when they talk about moralityn In fact, I think this diference is 
indicatve of a persistent divide in meaningn
Consider these further accounts of morality from anthropologistsn En O Wilsonfs infuental text 
Soiiobiology says that mMoral commitment is entrely learned… children simply internalize the 
behavioral norms of the societyf (Wilson 1975, 562-563)n More recently, primatologist Frans De Waal 
defnes morality as: ma compass for lifefs choices that takes the interests of the entre community into 
accountfn Major philosophical and theological ethicists, on the other hand, suggest defnitons like 
mthe use of reason to answer the worldview-shaping queston “how should life be lived”?f (Chappell 
2009, 3)n Thc Cambridgc Diitonary of Philosophhy describes morality as man informal public system 
applying to all ratonal personsf ((Gert 1999, 586)n
It is generally accepted in all of these felds that morality – whatever it is – is somehow acton-
guiding or character-formingn Moral systems, facts, precepts or codes exert somc kind of force on 
moral agents (whatever they are) such that moral agents are inclined to act, think and/or live in a 
partcular wayn The key diference, it seems to me, lies in what this force is taken to be, or from 
where it is believed to originaten This is not enough to provide a complete account of morality (there 
will be disagreements over exactly what this force governs) but it is enough to identfy a key 
componentn Call these diferent views R and  :
R: Morality involves or depends upon ratonalityn
 : Morality involves or depends upon social normsn
Note that neither R or   necessarily excludes the other; it is possible to say that morality is exclusively
concerned with ratonality or social norms, but also possible to say that it involves bothn That we are 
social and politcal creatures is crucial to the ethics of ratonalists like Aristotle, who begins his Ethiis 
with the statement that his investgaton mis a kind of politcal sciencef (Aristotle 2004, 1094b 10)n R 
and   should be seen as representatve of a general diference in emphasisn Nor do I intend to 
homogenize either feldn It is my understanding that many later anthropologists are in substantal 
disagreement with the basic ethical behaviorism of Wilson; and De Waal and Bekoffs view that 
reason is not a foundatonal part of morality phcr se does not prevent either from acknowledging that 
complex reasoning is a characteristc feature of human moral behaviorn Disagreements certainly exist 
between philosophers, notably in the sentmentalist thought of Hume and Hutcheson and, more 
recently, Bernard Williams and Philippa Footfs atack on the insttuton of morality n Despite the 
internal diferences, though, there seems to be a general focus within anthropology on the social as 
the ground of morality, whereas within philosophy and theology ratonality receives at least equal 
billingn
Who gets to be moral?
It should now be clearer why there is division over the restricton (or not) of morality to 
humansn If morality is primarily grounded in ratonality, then it makes sense to think of it as a 
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distnctvely human traitn Reason or ratonality here does not mean anything like promoton of self-
interest, or dispassionate pragmatsm (Korsgaard 2010)n Instead it is the capacity for justfable 
thinking, drawing valid conclusions and logical thoughtn Practcal reasoning, ofen taken as a hallmark
of moral acton, is the applicaton of the above to actonn Human capacites – in partcular language 
and symbolic thought – give rise to the kind of abstract and practcal reasoning that is (on this 
account) required for morality (Tse 2008)n Non-humans, lacking these capacites, cannot qualify as 
moral agentsn This, however, is down to circumstance and not necessity: if non-humans did exhibit 
these capacites they would indeed be moral agentsn Kant in partcular takes pains to emphasise this 
point:  it is ratonality, not humanity, that makes the diference here (Kant 1997, 4:410-412)n
Note that R does not entail that social norms or emotons play no role in morality; it can recognize 
them as extremely importantn It simply holds that reason is ncicssary for morality; not that it is 
sufcient – although stronger versions of R may indeed claim ratonality as the primary or overriding 
component of moralityn Nor does R require that reason always be exercised; merely that the agent 
possess the capacity to exercise itn This is a stronger theme in Aristotelian and Thomist virtue ethics 
than in Kantanism; the emphasis on the habitual nature of virtue means that we do not wholly 
govern them (Aristotle 2004, 1114a 10-25)n Aquinas also thinks it possible that we bear responsibility
in cases where we neglect reason (Aquinas 1948, 1a2ae 6n8)n
On the other hand, if morality is grounded in social norms then it seems at least an open queston 
whether it is restricted to humansn The queston is, from what capacites are the relevant social 
norms derived? Human culture is unique in its complexity and depends on the human ability to 
create and share symbolic thought (Calcagno and Fuentes 2012)n If symbolic thought, ratonality or 
some other distnctvely human capacity plays a formatve role in moral social norms then morality 
will, afer all, be restricted to humansn Alternatvely, if any social structure will sufce, then creatures 
such as ants or shrimps will qualify as moral agentsn I suspect that most adherents of   would agree 
that this stretches the term m oralf beyond their intended usage, although given that the bounds of 
the moral are precisely what is at stake here I cannot deny that this is a positon open to themn 
However, the best candidate for the origin of morally relevant social norms is emoton or partcular 
afectve statesn Bekof highlights animal capacites for mempathy, forgiveness, trust, reciprocity and 
much moref and suggests that the diference between moral and non-moral creatures is down to 
mstrong emotonal and cognitve cuesf (Bekof and Pierce 2009, 3, 13)n That non-humans possess the 
capacity for these states will meet with litle resistancen Alasdair MacIntyre notes that even thinkers 
who reject the presence of thought or belief in non-humans mare generally careful not to deny that 
non-human animals perceive, feel and in some cases give evidence of at least some intelligencef 
(MacIntyre 1999, 13)n Even Descartes, notorious for his view that animals are automata and censured
by MacIntyre for his msillinessf may in fact have thought that they were both feeling and conscious 
beings (Cotngham 1978)n
The positons are now beginning to take shapen If R is correct, then morality is indeed distnctvely 
humann If   is correct then morality may or may not be exclusive to humans, depending on the 
origins of moral social normsn Call this extended positon  2:
 2: Morality involves or depends upon social norms and the relevant social norms are 
derived solely from capacites not unique to humansn
The best candidate for the origin of these social norms in  2 is emotonn
These positons are closely related to the debate between moral sentmentalism and moral 
ratonalismn Moral sentmentalism covers several views but they all agree that memotons and desires 
play a leading role in the anatomy of moralityf (Kauppien 2016)n Moral ratonalism instead gives this 
leading role to reasonn  2 must reject ratonalism; but it is not enough to simply embrace any kind of 
sentmentalismn It is litle surprise that De Waal references Hume – probably the most infuental 
sentmentalist – approvingly (De Wall 2006, 66)n But Humefs sentmentalism does not go far enough 
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to support  2n Although he agrees that sentment is mthat which renders morality an actve principlef, 
he thinks that
in order to pave the way for such a sentment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it 
is ofen necessary, we fnd, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distnctons be 
made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relatons examined, 
and general facts fxed and ascertainedn
Although Hume ponders the possibility of a prototypical moral sense in some animals, he also thinks 
that humans possess a kind of moral judgement that animals do not (Beauchamp 1999)n I think that 
Humefs sentmentalism represents a class of sentmentalists that will not do for adherents of  2n 
Although they agree that sentment is the foundaton for morality, they stll give reason some kind of 
role such that is is necessary for moralityn Fitng-attude sentmentalists are another group in this 
classn Conversely,  2 requires that reason have no necessary role in morality at all – although note 
that  2 does not entail that reason cannot have a role in thought about moralityn
I think there is a possible critque to my positon here which would broaden the scope of  2n It goes 
like this: Morality is foundatonally sentmental; human moral actvity also involves reason, but this is
not sufcient to represent a diference in kind between non-human and human moralityn  o we can 
refer to mhuman moralityf and mhyena moralityf as fundamentally similar actvites/states, although 
(due to the exercise of reason) diferent in expression and the processes they involven  This is the 
view of De Waal, Bekof and Pierce (De Waal 2006, 37-42; Bekof and Pierce 2009, 139-141)
I am not convinced by this argument; I think that the presence of reason consttutes too stark a 
diference between human and hyena morality for the diference to be one of degreen However, I 
intend to leave it aside for nown Regardless of how accessible (or not) various kinds of sentmentalism
are for  2, if ratonalism is correct morality is indeed a distnctvely human trait; and it is for the 
correctness of ratonalism that I intend to arguen
Being reasonable
Let me begin by looking at an inescapable part of moral agency: moral assessmentn If I am a moral 
agent then I am open to assessment by moral standardsn Whether those standards are diverse or 
united and whether they fnd their origin in moral facts, (God, personal inclinaton, a social contract 
or none or all of the above can be put asiden Whatever morality is, if I take part in it I enter a world of
praise and blame; good and bad; obligaton and supererogatonn I may fourish or fail to act in 
accordance with universal lawn I may be cruel, kind, honest, thoughtless, altruistc, prideful, cowardly,
just and much more besides (although probably not all at once)n In other words, I have moral 
rcsphonsibilityn To be a moral agent means being held to moral standardsn
 o what is it that is being assessed when an agent is judged by moral standards? I will begin by ruling 
out one possibility: we are not simply judging the eventn This ought to be clear from the fact that 
quite diferent moral judgments can be formed about the same eventn I rush into a burning building 
to save a child for its sake and the sake of its distraught parentsn I am a courageous heron I rush into a 
burning building to save a child for the sake of the TV cameras and the publicity which will help my 
politcal campaignn I am scheming and self-servingn Of course this does not mean that we cannot 
assess the acton – good, in both cases – but there is something more going on as welln The phcrson, 
as well as the deed, is in the moral dockn In other words, moral assessment has something to do with
internal statesn In this at least I am in agreement with my opponentsn De Waal notes that mIn 
discussing what consttutes morality, the actual behavior is less important than the underlying 
capacites… whether animals are nice to each other is not the issuef (De Waal 2006, 16)n In the 
second half of this paper, Marcus Baynes-Rock also stresses the point that signifcant diferences 
between animal and human social behavior do not in themselves demonstrate that animals are not 
moral agentsn I think this is correct – but just as behavioral diferences are not necessarily a point 
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against animal morality, nor are they a point in its favorn Acton phcr sc is not the primary focus of 
moral assessmentn
Instead I suggest that what is under analysis is the agentfs reason for actng: why they did or thought 
that rather than thisn Diferent reasons for acton are precisely what makes the diference in the 
example aboven But note that not all reasons for acton are of the same kindn In her infuental work 
on intenton, Elizabeth Anscombe says that there seem to be diferent kinds of reason or explanaton 
for acton (Anscombe 1956)n Consider these explanatons: mI coughed because I had a tckle in my 
throatf; m he jumped because of that bangfn Compare them to these: mI gave them a raise because I 
wanted to reward themf; mI came to cheer him upfn Anscombe thinks that we recognize a diference 
between these reasonsn The later kind invoke intcntons; the former do notn Instead, Anscombe says 
that the former kind of reasons involve what she calls m ental causesfn The distncton between 
intentonal and non-intentonal behaviour is highly signifcant in the history of philosophy; many 
thinkers, including Anscombe, identfy the presence of intenton as the diference between a simple 
bodily event or mhappeningf, and an acton propern
What is the diference between intentons and m ental causesf? Anscombe (I think correctly) says 
that the diference between an intenton and a mental cause is that the kind of reasons that are 
intentons involve consideraton of the reason or the related acton as something good or badn At its 
heart this is a psychological point; it is rooted in the observaton that when we act intentonally, we 
necessarily identfy some kind of good towards which we actn Whether we are right that our acton is
aimed at something good, or whether there might be beter goods to aim for, are open questonsn 
Clearly we end up aiming at the wrong thing all too ofenn What Anscombe is saying here is that the 
aim of our acton must must on some level sccm good at the tme; intentonal acton involves desire 
of some kindn
In other words, intentonal actons are aimed at something; and the selecton of the target is what 
Anscombe is referring to when she says that intentons involve the consideraton of good (something 
to be aimed at) or badn Aquinas is another thinker who believes that a perceived good is necessary in
order to form an intenton or move the will; and in fact, he thinks that without an intenton an event 
does not strictly speaking qualify as an acton at all (Aquinas 1948, 1a2ae 8n1, 12n1, 18n9n)n There is 
broad support for this view in modern acton theoryn Opposing thinkers like Harry Frankfurt and 
Donald Davidson typically agree that intentonal acts are a special class of event, but disagree on 
how intenton makes actons distnctve (Frankfurt 1997; Davidson 2001)n Hume also relies on the 
observaton that intenton necessarily involves a perceived good in his account of acton and 
morality; his sentmentalism stems from his view that the passions alone, and not reason, are 
responsible for volitons borne out of those perceived goods (Hume 2000, 2n3n3)n
This is why moral assessment looks at reasons for acton, and specifcally intenton: it is because that 
is where we fnd the agentfs judgments about goodness and badness, and their choices to do with 
goodness and badnessn Note that the intentonal actons in my example above are precisely the kind 
of acton that is open to moral assessment; whereas the m entally causedf actons are notn The 
observaton that intenton involves deliberaton about goodness is behind the common philosophical
view that moral goodness is to do with goodness of the will – present in Kant, Aquinas, and ancient 
and neo-Aristotelianism (Foot 2001, 14)n
Also present in all of these traditons is a commitment to something approaching Kantfs principle 
that mought implies canf (Kant 1998, A548/B576)n This is the view that if we have a moral obligaton it 
must be possible to fulfll that obligaton; otherwise, we would not be obliged to do itn mObligatonf is 
less fundamental to Aristotelianism than Kantanism; but when it comes to moral assessment both 
think that praise or blame only properly apply when we have a choicen Theologians like Aquinas 
typically think we incapable of freeing ourselves from original sin; but even there, the possibility of 
actng well (through divine infusion of the virtues) exists and he states that choice, part of moral 
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acton, mis only of possible thingsf (Aquinas 1948, 1a2ae 13n5)n A more sophistcated version of the 
principle which seems to me to be consistent with virtue ethicists like Aristotle and Aquinas holds 
that mought implies canf should be taken to mean that there is a possible world in which the moral 
obligaton is fulflled (or moral good achieved) (Donagan 1984)n mOught implies canf is also at the crux 
of the intersecton between ethics and free will theory; if we are not free, the thought goes, we 
cannot do otherwise and hence cannot bear moral responsibility (Van Inwagen 1999)n
 o where does all this get us? I have made three main points heren Firstly: Moral acton and 
assessment is at least in part to do with reasons for actonn  econdly: The relevant reasons for acton 
necessarily involve an identfcaton of goodness/badnessn Thirdly: Moral acton and assessment 
implies the presence of choice, or alternate possibilitesn
From these I suggest that moral actvity necessarily involves dclibcraton about rcasonsn As Rn Mn 
Hare points out, this process of deliberaton is essentally ratonal, because it requires an 
understanding of and comparison between the nature and implicatons of diferent choices and 
reasons (Hare 1979)n The word mdeliberatonf here should not be taken to imply that moral acton requires 
protracted conscious consideraton; many ratonalists allow that moral reasoning can be intuitve or the 
product of habitn What maters is the awareness and assessment of diferent reasons for actonn The process 
itself can be very briefn
When we assess someone morally we are assessing what reasons for acton they identfed as goodn 
Does the good that they identfed in forming their intentons match up to what we consider to be 
the true good (whatever that is)? This process of deliberaton is the practcal reasoning discussed 
aboven For both Kant and Aristotle it is the foundatonal moral actvity, although they have diferent 
conceptons of its scopen It is practcal reasoning that I take to be distnctvely human, and practcal 
reasoning that makes the connecton between moral goodness and ratonalityn To borrow Footfs 
comment on this subject: mThe discussion has been about human goodness in respect of reason 
recogniton and reason following, and if that is not practcal ratonality I should like to know what isf 
(Foot 2001, 13)n
MacIntyre makes the same point:
Human practcal ratonality certainly has among its distnctve features the ability to stand 
back from onefs inital judgments about how one should act and to evaluate them by a 
variety of standards… Where my reason for actng is or has been of the form mdoing x will 
enable me to achieve yf, where myf stands for some good, refecton on this reason will 
require me to ask mIn this situaton do I have a beter reason for actng than that doing x will 
enable me to achieve y?f
MacIntyre thinks, and I agree, that this process of reasoning requires uniquely human capabilites, 
including language use and symbolic thoughtn This is the kind of ratonality discussed aboven Without
it it is not possible to deliberate about reasons for actonn I have argued that deliberaton about 
reasons for acton is fundamental to moral actvity and is what we look for when we make moral 
judgmentsn Positon R above is correct; ratonal thinking, specifcally prudence, is necessarily part of 
morality; and this makes morality distnctvely humann
mCorrectf here can only reach a certain standardn I am convinced by ratonalism because I think that 
without reason partcular capacites, actons and states cannot exist; and I take those capacites, 
actons and states to be necessary components of moralityn It is open to my opponent to bite the 
bullet and deny that morality does require any such thingn If he does so then we really will have 
reached an impasse; a breach in meaning such that the best we can hope for is mutual awareness 
but not agreementn  hould this happen I simply note that whatever we choose to call it, humans do 
exhibit a capacity for ratonal deliberaton about acton and intenton that signifcantly distnguishes 
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them from non-humans; and I take this diference to be stark enough that it deserves its own namen I
suggest m oralityf; but it is up to the reader to deciden
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PART 2: Marcus Baynes-Rock
MORALITY IN ANIMALS
Introducton
The queston of animal morality is elusive in no small part because there are more than two positons
in the debaten Conspicuous among these positons is that of Bekof and Piercen They hold that 
animals are indeed capable of morality and they employ numerous examples of animals behaving 
apparently morally to support their case (Bekof and Pierce 2009; Bekof 2005)n Their positon 
appeals to me because it gives a descriptve account of animal morality with normatve elementsn For
example the descriptve element sees morality include not just values that align with human values 
( hapiro 2006), it allows for say wolf morality to encompass what it is to be a good wolfn But at the 
same tme its normatve elements hold moral behaviour to be universally pro-social and other-
regarding (Bekof and Pierce 2009, 148)n I do agree that moral behaviour must be other-regarding, 
however with regard to pro-sociality, if this implies sociality between beings of the same species then
I think it is too narrown In fact I would argue that moral behaviour can encompass actng with regard 
to more than just other beings; it can include regard for entre ecosystems (Leopold 1949)n When I 
choose to take my paint thinners to the rubbish dump, rather than let it run into the stormwater 
drain, I am indeed actng pro-socially but, assuming my intentons are more than simply avoiding 
prosecuton, I am also actng with regard to the geology and life forms that lie at the other end of the
stormwater drainn However for the purposes of my argument I will focus on the moral consideraton 
that one creature, whether human or otherwise, might have for anothern It is in this space of 
interacton beyond onefs species that I see morality as more than humann
Another positon is that of Frans De Waal who argues for morality in animals based on evolutonary 
parsimony (De Waal 2014)n De Waal is a primatologist so understandably he employs examples of 
apes and monkeys behaving morally to argue that humans are not the only moral speciesn Thus 
humans simply exhibit a scaled-up form of morality that is in essence no diferent from that of other 
animalsn We adhere to a set of norms and values crucial to social cohesion and so do other social 
primatesn (Gary Francione calls this the similar minds approach and sees an underlying danger in this 
line of reasoningn By grantng that certain animals have characteristcs similar to humans they are 
given greater moral consideraton (Francione 2005)n  Thus by setng humans as the yardstck by 
which morality in other species is measured, we consign those species to a lesser kind of morality 
and ironically undermine inclusion of animals in our moral spheresn In this I agree with Francione 
especially with regard to measures of sentence and language being used to determine moral 
consideraton of other species (see also Deane-Drummond 2015, 265; Deane-Drummond, Arner and 
Fuentes 2016, 127)n But I also diverge from De Waalfs thesis in holding morality to be immanent in 
relatons between moral agents regardless of speciesn In other words, my account leaves open the 
space for moral agency in other beings regardless of how closely related they are to humansn
Whereas my positon in some ways aligns with those championed by Bekof and De Waal, it is more 
directly opposed to that of Foot, MacIntyre and Korsgaardn This is known as the cognitvist positon 
(Foot 1995)n MacIntyre holds an interestng positon in relaton to De Waal in that he grants dolphins 
the same capacity as humans to identfy in conjuncton a set of reasons for actonn But he holds that 
mhumans are diferent because we can evaluate our reasons for acton for beter or worsenf 
(MacIntyre 1999, 96)n This is the essence of the argument for morality being exclusive to humansn It 
holds that there are goods to which humans should aim in order to be good mqua humansf and that 
only through practcal reason can humans arrive at judgements about to which good they should 
striven These are therefore moral judgementsn As for non-human animals, according to this 
argument, they are not capable of the necessary kind of practcal reason – stepping back and 
assessing their actons – and therefore are incapable of moralityn I have two reservatons about this 
argument for morality based on moral judgementsn One is the unfounded assumpton that animals 
are wantonsn This assumpton is made frequently in the literature usually with a lot of hedging 
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language, as animals donft mseemf to have a capability for practcal reason (Korsgaard 2010, 5-6)n 
However, despite the fragility of this premise I want to set it aside in favour of my main reservaton 
which is the slippage between morality and moral judgementn I concur with MacIntyre that there can
be a set of goods that make one a good human or good dolphin and this is where I diverge from De 
Waal and Bekof because I think that while altruism and cooperaton might be moral for humans – in 
certain cases – I do not think that always hold for other animalsn Animal morality may look quite 
diferent from what we, as humans, expect morality to look like, but that does not mean it is not 
moralityn But I difer from MacIntyre in that I argue that morality is not only relatonal, it is in essence
intuited and afectven Therefore, making judgements about intuitons and afects – as per the 
cognitvist positon - is not morality, rather it is moral judgementn This is the categorical error that I 
suggest my dear colleague is making aboven  
For Christne Korsgaard, morality is a manifestaton of what she calls mnormatve self-governmentf 
(Korsgaard 2010, 6)n This has parallels with MacIntyrefs thesis which holds that it lies in practcal 
reasonn For Korsgaard the basis of morality lies in the capacity that humans have for theory of mindn 
Before we are capable of morality we must be able to identfy in ourselves our own motves and 
reasons and make judgements about thesen As such, animals are incapable of morality because 
according to Korsgaard they do not have a self-analytcal capability that is a corollary of theory of 
mindn Korsgaard acknowledges that there is an element of wantng humans to be special in defning 
morality as uniquely human and this comes to undermine her argumentn  he says mif altruistc and 
cooperatve behaviour were the essence of morality then the ants and bees would be our moral 
heroesnf (Korsgaard 2010, 6)n But this is entrely circularn There is no reason to fnd morality in ants 
and bees unpalatable other than the assumpton that morality is a capacity only found in beings with
reason – inen humansn As with my positon in relaton to Willows and MacIntyre, I argue that 
Korsgaard is in fact talking about moral judgements rather than morality and that we should not 
exclude other species from moral agency simply because of their comparatvely lesser reasoning 
powersn
Jonathan Haidt argues that the cognitvist positon is akin to an argument for the tail wagging the dog
(Haidt, 2001)n Whereas cognitvists hold that practcal reason leads to judgements which motvate 
individuals to moral actons, Haidt argues that practcal reason is in fact informed by moral intuitons 
and that it has a very limited infuence in the other directonn Haidt butresses his argument with a 
review of empirical research into morality and moral decision makingn What emerges from the 
research is what Haidt calls a msocial intuitonist modelnf (Haidt 2001, 1024)n This model allows for 
reasoning to infuence intuiton but only in a very few cases; it is normally applied post hoc to 
judgements and actons based on intuitonn The experiments show that whether or not there is tme 
to reason moral judgements follow moral intuitonsn Accordingly Haidt ascribes the system of 
intuited morality to mall mammalsf because his system has an innate basis and normally operates 
prior to and even contrary to practcal reason (Haidt 2001, 1029)n
An example of the empirical evidence for the social intuitonist model is a study from Joshua (Greene 
and colleaguesn These researchers presented moral dilemmas to their subjects and used fMRI scans 
to track the brain actvity of subjects during their responses ((Greene et aln 2001)n The dilemmas 
presented were along the lines of the trolley dilemman In one “personal” variant the subject was told 
that they could save fve people from being run over by a trolley if only they pushed one person onto
the tracksn In another “impersonal” variant they were told they could save fve people from the 
trolley if they pulled a switch which diverted the trolley onto a track on which one person stoodn 
What these researchers found was that in the mpersonalf variant subjects were a lot slower to make 
the response of mappropriatef than they were in the impersonal variant where the tme to respond 
with appropriate or inappropriate was the samen Moreover the brain areas that showed increased 
relatve actvaton during the response to the moral personal conditon were areas associated with 
emotonn What this suggests is that these areas of emotonal processing infuence moral judgement 
and not vice versa (see also (Glenn, Raine and  chug, 2009)n
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I subscribe to Haidtfs social intuitonist model insofar as it recognises the primacy of afect in moral 
agency and places practcal reason in its rightul placen Afer all if practcal reason held primacy then 
calculatng psychopaths would be expected to act morallyn But this is not the case because evidence 
shows that they lack the emotonal brain actvity necessary to make moral decisions ((Glenn et aln 
2001, 5)n Where I must diverge from Haidt, however, is in how morality is defnedn Here Haidt 
suggests that there are innate intuitons which form the raw material onto which cultural and social 
norms, which resonate with those intuitons, are overlaidn I do not fnd this overly problematc in 
itself, apart from the use of the term minnatef which undermines the connectons between genes and 
developmentn However, for the purposes of the argument presented here I suggest that this 
defniton of morality – a system of norms partcular to a community – is not what Willows has in 
mindn This does not undermine Haidtfs argument because it does not hinge on his defniton of 
moralityn The empirical evidence that Haidt provides is sound, even if applied to MacIntyrefs 
defniton, but I seek to nuance it with respect to fnding common ground with my opponentn 
Where I do fnd a close correspondence with my positon is in Celia Deane-Drummondfs model of 
minter-morality nf (Deane-Drummond 2015, 263)n This is an evoluton of her earlier ideas which lean 
towards animalsf capacites for moral judgements and evolutonary contnuity between social 
primates and humans (Deane-Drummond 2009)n What Deane-Drummondfs later model does, that is 
in my view progressive, is to present a relatonal kind of morality which sees human beings, not as 
individuals contemplatng what they ought to do, but as beings caught up in a world of relatons with
other beings; relatons which have moral consequences and not just in one directonn This model 
does away with the humanist model of morality because it allows for other species to inhabit moral 
worlds that do not necessarily cohere with human moral worldsn Thus even where there is litle 
coherence, there is stll moral overlap and this is what becomes signifcantn Wisdom and morality are 
not merely things that are contained in individualsn However, while Deane-Drummond and I both 
argue for morality as a product of relatons, I am inclined more towards morality as immanent in 
relatonsn
For the purposes of my argument I would like to enlist the support of a rather unlikely candidate for 
animal morality: a spoted hyenan I say unlikely because spoted hyenas have a reputaton as 
cowardly scavengers who steal for a living rather than hunt for themselvesn This is of course a 
culturally biased view and ironically does not gel with the views held by the people who co-exist with
spoted hyenas in my study site: the city of Harar, Ethiopian It is there that hyenas are appreciated by 
the locals not just for cleaning the streets of garbage but for protecton against harmful spirits and 
services that they perform for the townfs msaintsnf In fact my research in Harar shows that most 
Hararis not only appreciate hyenas, they have no problem ascribing moral agency to hyenasn I have 
collected accounts from many people of hyenas repaying kind behaviour and actng against people 
who harm their clan members or cause them insults (Baynes-Rock 2015)n However, rather than 
pitng the Harari perspectves against those of moral philosophers, I instead want to present my own
experience of hyena morality to support my case for morality in animalsn In doing so I shall not be 
trying to demonstrate morality in spoted hyenas as a species; instead I shall be arguing that morality
is emergent in relatons between a human being (me) and a spoted hyena named Willin
The context for my relatonship with Willi was a hyena feeding place just outside Hararfs town wall 
where free-ranging hyenas visit each night and are fed by a mhyena mannf By the tme Willi appeared 
on the scene I had been visitng the feeding place nightly for four months, spending my nights 
making observatons of hyenas as they came and wentn Willi was diferent to the other hyenasn While
the others tolerated my presence but made no efort at interactng with me, Willi insisted on some 
kind of engagementn Afer a couple of weeks Willi decided that I was someone, or something, worth 
investgatngn I have no idea whether he considered me a self-propelled object or an intentonal 
being at the tme but in either case his frst atempt at any kind of interacton was to approach me 
and try to bite my kneen He persisted in this and I persisted in moving my leg away (In their prime, 
hyenas can exert 4000n of pressure with their jaws and even at one year old they can crush bones)n 
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This manoeuvring contnued night afer night for a few weeks but eventually we arrived at an 
arrangement whereby he could bite my jacket sleeve and I could grab the fur on top of his headn
Once we were comfortable with physical contact it was but a small step for us to engage in 
interspecies playn Willi initated this one night when he was playing with another hyenan He ran up to 
me and began bitng which was efectvely an invitatonn This led to a chase around the hill behind 
the feeding place whereupon he tried to bite me and I tried to catch him while he dodged out of my 
wayn I knew it was play and not actual avoidance because Willi was signalling it to men He had his tail 
up and his mouth hanging open and afer every dodge, he returned to give me another try at 
grabbing himn Furthermore, Willi initated play with me on subsequent nights, something he would 
never have done had he thought I was chasing him with the intenton of hurtng himn
Bekof and Pierce hold play to be an clear indicator of morality in animalsn This is due to the inherent 
justce in play which enables it to functon despite social and physical disparitesn Animals must give 
honest signals that they intend to play or else they can rupture social relatonships (Bekof and Pierce
2009, 197)n They must follow certain rules of conduct and not take advantage of situatons in which 
they hold a superior positonn Thus there is a sense of fairness implicit in play and a set of 
expectatons held by the partcipants that what is play must remain playn Anyone transgressing must 
make amends or else be excluded from play and its socio-psycho-physiological beneftsn
While I agree with Bekof and Pierce about the implicit sense of fairness in play and its implicatons 
with regard to morality in animals, this is not what I intend to foreground with respect to arguing for 
animal moralityn Instead I wish to highlight the signifcance of our episodes of play in terms of the 
way that Willi perceived me as a distnct individualn Willi did not just play with anyone; not any hyena
and certainly not any humann He had certain friends with whom he played and with whom he had a 
more trustng relatonshipn He never played with the hyena man or his son and never played with the
higher ranking female hyenas such as Dibbey who persecuted himn  o his criteria for a playmate were
that it be someone familiar and someone who he was prety certain would not hurt himn That I ft 
these criteria is an indicaton that Willi saw me as someone distnct from other humans and hyenas 
and that this distncton was consistent over tmen He could make judgements about how I would act 
towards him based on how I had acted towards him in the past and thus he could apply a diferent 
set of rules to me than he applied to other humans who were yet to prove themselves trustworthyn
My relatonship with Willi extended well beyond chasing each other about on the hilln I accompanied 
him on his nightly forays into Hararfs Old Town looking for food and sometmes he accompanied men 
On one occasion a dog chased Willi onto a common beside the town wall, and I, feeling afronted, 
chased the dog from the common across to the old leper colonyn At that Willi joined me in the chase, 
gauging my intentons and following my lead, and we both pulled up, glaring at the dog as it 
disappeared into the nightn Indeed Willi even invited me to his homen One morning as the hyenas 
were making their way back to their dens outside the town, Willi convinced me to follow him to his 
den between a farm and a streamn I lagged behind, he stopped and waited; we were separated, he 
caught me up; once outside the den he made three atempts to try and get me to follow him insiden 
Willi and I saw each other as friends; we sought each other out on the hill behind the feeding place 
and at the garbage dumpn When we bumped into each other in the Old Town there was recogniton 
and familiarity that did not exist between other people and hyenasn But as human and hyena we 
brought a hybrid set of standards to our relatonship which guided our ways of relatngn And therein 
lies the model of inter-moralityn
I highlight the diference between my relatonship with Willi and that of other people and hyenas 
because it is about more than familiarity and trustn It is about one being recognising another as a 
subject of signifcance; as someone with whom they stand in relaton as a person worthy of moral 
consideratonn  This is where I diverge from Deane-Drummondfs account of inter-moralityn Whereas 
Deane-Drummondfs account holds inter-morality to be a sum of two parts, which between humans 
and other animals can be unequal in terms of their level of moral agency (Deane-Drummond, Arner 
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and Fuentes 2016, 135), I hold morality to be immanent in relatons and therefore the queston of 
levels of morality becomes irrelevantn  Borrowing from Martn Buber, this account of morality is one 
of the moral self, emerging out of consideraton of the Other as a capitalised Youn Buber calls this the 
I-You relaton wherein the self and Other merge in actualisaton of an ethical relaton (Buber 1970, 
151)n It resonates with Levinas and his account of the ethical demand made by the face of the othern 
In this Levinas is not talking about the literal face, but the Other as a capitalised You that demands of 
the self, consideraton (Levinas 1999, 25)n Thus Willi, by entering into relatons with me as a 
capitalised You became subject to a level of moral consideraton that was no diferent from that 
which fell upon men We both became bound by ways in which we ought to act in the presence of and
toward the Other and in this lies the morality of animalsn
In support of this is the suggeston that Willi could have atacked me, or at least biten of a chunk of 
men This is not far-fetched as atacks on people by hyenas in the region around Harar are well 
documented and widespreadn And certainly he was hungry enough because when food was made 
available, in the form of a dead ox or sheep, Willi gorged himselfn But he did not take advantage of 
the many opportunites that he had to bite a litle harder and take a chunk of my feshn On the one 
hand this could be because of a fear of repercussionsn He could have feared that I might somehow 
punish him if he transgressedn But then this would make it difcult to argue that Willi was a wantonn 
And fearing of repercussions is not incompatble with actng morallyn While fear of punishment might
inhibit me from killing my enemy, I can also be inhibited by the sense that it is wrongn In the same 
way, Willi not harming me due to fear of repercussions is not incompatble with his sense that it 
would be wrong to harm someone with whom he stands in ethical relaton; with someone who in 
Kantfs terms appears as an end and not as a meansn In entering into a relaton with me Willi was 
faced with a human looming large as a capitalised You and therefore a set of oughts that obliged him 
to act morallyn Whether or not he stopped to refect on that obligaton is not crucial to the fact that 
he chose to act in a way that was faithful to the relatonn
Conclusion
Afer much considered debate, each of us is convinced that the other is seriously mistaken about the 
nature and existence of animal moralityn Where to go from here? Fortunately, we are not in total 
disagreementn In fact, we both have very similar views of the situaton mon the groundfn Both of us 
think that there is such a thing as animal goods, appropriate to their own speciesn There is no sense 
in holding animals to human standards; but this need not mean that there are no standards that may
determine the success of an animal qua animaln We also agree that humans are remarkably diferent 
creatures with social norms that are far more complex than those of other speciesn  o, neither part 
of this paper should be read as an atempt to impugn either animals or humansn Instead, our 
disagreement is over the social and metaphysical signifcance of the diference between us and other
species, rather than the extent of the diference phcr scn Does morality consttute a fundamental 
break with the rest of the animal kingdom, is it the most complex example of a common theme, or is 
it something malleable that adapts to partcular relatons regardless of species?
Although we have been unable to setle the queston, our hope is that this paper will contribute to 
thought on this subject in a way that is accessible to readers in both feldsn However, we also hope 
that it brings to light the way diferent commitments and methodologies profoundly afect 
approaches to interdisciplinary workn This is especially so when working with such a loaded term as 
m oralityfn Having hashed it out in this paper, we do not expect to agree on this mater; but we do 
believe that we understand each othern
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